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UCC DRAFTING: METHOD AND MESSAGE
William D. Warren *
I. INTRODUCTION
My objective in this Essay is to discuss briefly the method of UCC
drafting and how that method affects the UCC's message. It has been
my experience that many law teachers, most lawyers and, of course, all
law students are largely unaware of how uniform laws like the UCC are
written. Were they more familiar with this process, I believe they would
have a deeper understanding of the UCC, its strengths and its weak-
nesses. 1 In the following pages I draw on my own experience in working
on uniform state laws.
I always wanted to work on the UCC. In a provincial sort of way, I
was given the opportunity to do so in the early 1960s when the Code's
proponents confidently brought it to California, expecting dutiful enact-
ment. California was, at that time, on its way to becoming the largest
state in the Union, and it found itself being presented with an elaborate
recodification of its commercial laws, drafted almost entirely by eastern
establishment lawyers and academics. California reacted to this alien
code by launching a fusillade of amendments, hundreds in number.
Some were born of ignorance; others were hopelessly provincial; still
others were clearly improvements over the uniform text.
The California Legislature formed a UCC advisory committee to
evaluate these proposed amendments and to make recommendations to
the California Legislature. This group adopted the same approach that
the New York study committee had chosen: They hired academics to do
the work. But the scale of the two projects differed. While the New
York Legislature appropriated enough money to complete the study and
enrich most of the commercial law academics on the eastern seaboard,
the Golden State sprung for a meager $1500 to be split between Harold
Marsh, Jr., then a member of the UCLA faculty, and his junior col-
league, the author. Harold's seniority entitled him to $800, and the re-
* Connell Professor, UCLA School of Law; B.A., 1948; J.D., 1950, University of Illi-
nois; J.S.D., 1957, Yale University.
1. A more extensive treatment of this subject, emphasizing the influence of history on the
Article 3, 4 and 4A project, is found in Fred H. Miller, U. C. C. Articles 3, 4 and 4A: A Study in
Process and Scope, 42 ALA. L. Rlv. 405 (1991). Professor Miller was a stalwart member of
the Articles 3, 4 and 4A project drafting committee and is now Executive Director of the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL).
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maining $700 went to me. The task lasted for years and culminated in a
report that was largely successful in persuading the committee and,
through it, the legislature to reject most of the proposed amendments. In
the end the legislature enacted a respectable version of the UCC, but the
message went out that henceforth California would have to be reckoned
with in the matter of uniform laws.
My next brush with the UCC came in the mid 1960s. My colleague,
Robert Jordan, and I were appointed co-reporters for the Uniform Con-
sumer Credit Code (UCCC).2 The UCCC was intended, in part, to rem-
edy an omission in the UCC. Professor Gilmore noted that a 1949 draft
of the UCC contained a part on consumer-goods financing that included
disclosure requirements for credit contracts and abolition of the holder-
in-due-course rule for consumer paper, among a number of other con-
sumer protection provisions.' It is important to note, for the tale I have
to tell in this Essay, that the drafters soon gave up on consumer protec-
tion: "The controversy over the consumer question was one of the most
violent in the history of the Code's drafting. The decision to abandon the
field was no doubt wise in view of the demonstrated impossibility of ar-
riving at a satisfactory solution."' 4 The UCCC project was conceived to
arrive at that "satisfactory solution" that Gilmore found impossible.
Gilmore proved right.
Although most observers conceded that the UCCC was a sensible
approach to the regulation of consumer credit, only eleven states adopted
it.5 Proponents, working the state legislatures for the UCCC, finally con-
cluded that consumerism, like politics, is basically local. A consumer
agenda that might delight an activist group in Massachusetts could find
rejection with a similar group in Texas, which, of course, had its own
agenda. Legislatures in the 1960s and 1970s delighted in passing laws
that addressed the latest creditor outrage that was featured in the media.
Consumer protection statutes usually cost the state nothing and, whether
effective or not, are invariably popular with constituents. Legislatures
had no wish to give up this pursuit in the interest of uniformity. Con-
sumer frauds, though universal, are not uniform.
2. UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, 1968 ACT, 7 U.L.A. 580 (1985).
3. GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 9.2, at 292
(1965).
4. Id at 293.
5. Seven states and Guam enacted the 1968 version of the UCCC. UNIF. CONSUMER
CREDIT CODE, 1968 ACT, 7 U.L.A. 208 (Supp. 1992). Four states enacted the 1974 version.
UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, 1974 AT, 7A U.L.A. I (Supp. 1992).
[Vol. 26:811
UCC DRAFTING
II. THE UCC CONSENSUS APPROACH
My call to duty finally came in 1985, when Robert Jordan and I
were invited to serve as co-reporters for a project to revise UCC Articles
3 and 4 and to draft a new Article 4A on wire transfers. The New Pay-
ments Code (NPC) 6 had proved too visionary to gain support outside the
academy. As a reaction to what was seen as the overly expansive reach
of the NPC,7 we were charged with doing only simple repairs on Articles
3 and 4 and coming up with something in the area of wire transfers that
would find a middle ground between the corporate users and the major
electronic funds transfer systems, Fedwire and CHIPS.8 These modest
goals were thought to be attainable in two years, three years at most.
Different parts of the UCC and its revisions have been drafted in
somewhat different manners. Our Article 3, 4 and 4A project, though
co-sponsored by both the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) and the American Law Institute (ALI),
was drafted under the NCCUSL rules. A drafting committee was ap-
pointed from members of the NCCUSL and the ALI; some committee
members were extremely expert in our field of inquiry, but others were
less so.
A number of consultants and advisors were appointed to meet regu-
larly with the drafting committee. They represented the American Bar
Association, the American Bankers Association, the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, the Federal Reserve Board and various
Federal Reserve banks, the New York Clearing House Association, the
National Automated Clearing House Association, elements of the bank-
ing industry and various groups representing consumers of banking serv-
6. For a good account of the history of the NPC's various draft incarnations, see Roland
E. Brandel & Anne Geary, Electronic Funds Transfers and the New Payments Code, 37 Bus.
LAW. 1065, 1072-78 (1982) and Fred H. Miller, A Report on the New Payments Code, 39 Bus.
LAW. 1215 (1984). Despite repeated attempts to "fix" the NPC, the project was finally aban-
doned and the project to revise Articles 3 and 4 began in its stead. See Miller, supra note 1, at
409.
7. The case for the limiting influence of the NPC experience on the Articles 3, 4 and 4A
project is made by Professor Fred H. Miller, an active participant in both projects. Miller,
supra note 1, at 410-16.
8. "Fedwire is a communication and settlement system owned and operated by the twelve
Federal Reserve Banks .... Thus, the Fed participates directly in the settlement of interbank
obligations and provides settlement sources as well as communication services." Hal S. Scott,
Corporate Wire Transfers and the Uniform New Payments Code, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1664,
1671 (1983) (footnotes omitted).
CHIPS "is owned and operated by the New York Clearing House Association, an organi-
zation composed of the twelve major New York City banks. CHIPS is a communications and
net settlement system for payments made by and to... participant banks located in New York
City .... I" Id.
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ices. The meetings of the drafting committee were open to the public,
and a number of academics, lawyers and other interested parties partici-
pated in these meetings at various times during the project. As soon as
the drafting committee got under way, the American Bar Association
appointed an Ad Hoc Committee on Payment Systems, which met semi-
annually with the reporters to review the work of the drafting committee.
Membership on this committee was open to all members of the Section
on Business Law, and a large group of banking and user representatives,
as well as interested lawyers and academics, attended these meetings.
The ALI-UCC Consultative Group also met with the reporters as a re-
view group. My best estimate is that twenty-eight academics partici-
pated in the project in different capacities and at different times.
Beginning in 1987, drafts of the three articles were considered at the an-
nual meetings of the NCCUSL, the ALI and the ALI Council.
The drafting procedure called for the reporters to prepare issues pa-
pers, then solution papers and, finally, drafts of provisions. The drafting
committee received the drafts before meetings and commented on them
during meetings held three or four times each year. The drafts were
available to the interested public, and publication of each draft was fol-
lowed by a flood of written commentary from experts in the field. Some
advisors and consultants prepared voluminous memoranda on each
draft. The reporters considered all of this information in preparing fur-
ther drafts; each was greeted by the same volume of critical response
from the many participants in this enterprise. Drafts were read, word for
word, at each of the annual meetings of the NCCUSL, with discussion
following each section. ALI review was less detailed and concentrated
more on major policy issues. The ABA Ad Hoc Committee was almost
as thorough in its examination of the drafts as the drafting committee.
I recount these tedious details because I think the method by which
the UCC was drafted greatly affects its message. Our project seemed
interminable. The original two-to-three year estimate proved unrealistic;
we were at the project for five years, and even then some wanted it to
continue. Article 3 had to be completely redrafted, and Article 4 was
materially altered. As the preceding paragraphs indicate, many people
were involved in the project. At a crucial point in the consideration of
Article 4A, there may have been 100 people in attendance. All affected
interests were given an opportunity to be heard, and most of them ap-
peared. My claim in this Essay is that one of the principal reasons that
the original UCC and, for the most part, its revisions constitute the best
commercial legislation being drafted is that many people who know a
great deal about the subject were given ample time to sit around a table
[Vol. 26:811
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and talk to each other about the problems to be solved. The NCCUSL
and ALI format of concentrating on the specific proposals in a draft mer-
cifully avoids speech making by the.participants. People with diverse
and conflicting interests get to know one another over time and in most
instances come to respect each other's views. Professor Miller contends
that the NPC would have been more acceptable if more people affected
by its provisions had been allowed to participate in its formulation. 9
This process worked at its best in the deliberations on Article 4A.
At first, the differences among the three principal players-the Fed,
CHIPS and the large corporate users-seemed intractable. The prob-
lems were exacerbated by the Fed's dual role as both a regulator and a
participant in its operation of Fedwire. Initially, these three groups
seemed to enjoy bashing each other at our meetings. But over the years,
owing in no small measure to the intelligence, judgment and firmness of
Robert Jordan, who drafted Article 4A, differences were narrowed and a
reasonable degree of consensus was achieved. A leading financial serv-
ices lawyer and a veteran of many legislative projects noted that never
before had so many people knowledgeable about the legal and opera-
tional problems of wholesale wire transfers spent so much time together
going over legislative proposals in such exhausting detail. He likened it
to peeling the layers of an onion. In the end it worked. Article 4A has
been enacted in approximately forty states in just three years and has
been adopted by the Fed as the governing regulation for Fedwire. 1°
Although the regulation of wholesale wire transfers was arguably a
national concern deserving congressional action, the NCCUSL and ALI
undertook the task because of the silent assumption that no one (includ-
ing the Fed) trusted Congress to do the job. This is understandable. In
Congress the bill would have been the province of a subcommittee, hav-
ing life or death control over the measure, with a chair and staff that
might have been quite unfamiliar with the complexities of wire transfers
or, worse still, who may have harbored hostility toward some partici-
pants in the field. Hearings would have been held that, typically, would
have consisted of representatives of interest groups making speeches to
the subcommittee, whose members might or might not have been in at-
tendance. Roles would have been played; voices would have been raised.
But no one would have listened because everyone would have understood
that the real work was being done in private. Access to the subcommit-
9. Miller, supra note 1, at 410. According to Professor Miller, the NPC was drafted by a
Permanent Editorial Board committee whose proceedings were less public than those of
NCCUSL drafting committees. See id. at 408 & n.5.
10. 12 C.F.R. §§ 210.25-.32 (1991).
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tee members and the staff would determine the shape that the final legis-
lation would take. The issues would have been publicly aired but
privately brokered. Congress's best work is done after it has convened a
commission to study the field-the Bankruptcy Code and the Electronic
Fund Transfer Act11 are examples-but this practice is fairly rare.
The Japanese are known for their consensus approach to decision
making-private, informal and nonlitigious-as compared to the Ameri-
can way which is seen as public, confrontational and highly litigious. 2
The UCC drafters seek consensus. After all, they have to present their
work to fifty legislatures for approval. But they do so in a very public
way, both in the conduct of their meetings and in the dissemination of
their interim drafts. One might assert that the likelihood of states ac-
cepting the revisions of the Code could be predicted by the measure of
consensus that the drafting committee achieved in the end product. The
first version of Article 2A had not attained sufficient consensus for wide-
spread enactment and underwent a substantial revision before it was ac-
cepted. Article 4A, on the other hand, did attain a high measure of
consensus, as its nationwide enactment attests.
III. LIMITATIONS ON THE UCC DRAFTING PROCESS
The shortcomings of a consensus approach are obvious. Compro-
mise reigns; bold initiatives are frustrated. The reporters' great ideas are
rejected, sometimes scorned.13 Problems that should have been ad-
dressed are sometimes left unresolved because agreement cannot be
reached. An example is found in the revision of Article 4. This article
has no scope provision. Its text reveals that it applies to "banks" that
handle "items."' 14 But before the revision of Article 4, there was no very
satisfactory definition of either the term "bank" or "item." Section 1-
201(4) defines a bank as meaning "any person engaged in the business of
11. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1693 (1982 & Supp. 1992).
12. In David G. Litt et al., Politics, Bureaucracies, and Financial Markets: Bank Entry
into Commercial Paper Underwriting in the United States and Japan, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 369
(1990), the authors compare decision making in Japan and the United States. They conclude
that with respect to bank entry into commercial paper underwriting, the decisional process in
Japan was "private, informal, non-litigious and not publicly confrontational," but in the
United States "the process was public, formalized, litigious and confrontational." Id. at 452.
13. My advice to young academics who are approached by the NCCUSL or ALI to work
on a uniform law or model code is to be prepared to abjure pride and embrace humility. The
views that wowed your admiring students may find rough going before real world lawyers and
judges. If your mission is to see your own ideas, unadulterated by the views of the Philistines,
brought to the public eye, stick to writing law review articles or, better yet, poetry.
14. U.C.C. § 4-102 (1990).
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banking."15 There is, of course, no definition of the business of banking.
One of our first initiatives in the revision of Article 4 was to produce a
definition of bank that would give the courts guidance as to what kinds of
institutions were covered by its provisions. At least we could make clear
that the term was not intended to apply to brokerage houses or mutual
funds.
After five years and innumerable drafts, we admitted defeat and set-
tled for revised section 4-105(1), which uses the same business-of-banking
language and lamely adds "including a savings bank, savings and loan
association, credit union, or trust company."16 But what about Merrill
Lynch, which issues check books and credit cards? Revised section 4-
403(c), which applies to the burden of establishing the fact and amount
of loss resulting from a payment over a stop order, 7 was another provi-
sion deserving of clarification, but, despite much effort, agreement on a
new formulation eluded us.
Drafting the UCC or any uniform law is inherently difficult because
fifty states must approve any revision or amendment-a process that usu-
ally takes a decade or two at best. Because the UCC is so hard to amend
in any uniform fashion, it has only limited utility in areas in which rapid
change is anticipated. This difficulty was apparent in dealing with the
area of truncation or "electronic presentment" of checks under revised
Article 4.18
Our present system of check collection is paper-based. Several bil-
lion checks each year are hauled around in airplanes and trucks so that
they can be physically presented to the banks on which they are drawn.
The expense of the transportation and security involved in such a process
is high, and the costs to the payees of the delay in funds availability are
evident. In view of the fact that payor banks make no visual examination
of the vast bulk of checks but rely solely on information contained in the
machine-readable information encoded on the checks, it is certain that
great economies could be achieved by having the bank in which a check
is deposited relay the encoded information electronically to the payor
bank on which the check is drawn. This is commonly called truncation,
or in the words of revised Article 4, "electronic presentment."' 9
15. Id. § 1-201(4).
16. Id. § 4-105. We did very little better in our new definition of "item," which provides
broadly that an item is any promise or order that a bank chooses to handle for collection or
payment. Id. § 4-104(9).
17. Id. § 4-403(c).
18. See id. § 4-110.
19. Id.
April 1993]
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Because the desirability of truncation seemed manifest and its even-
tual implementation inevitable, what could be done about it in revised
Article 4? Very little. We could hardly mandate a regime of truncation
at a time when the necessary banking technology was not in place and
when we had no reliable means of foreseeing what a fully realized trunca-
tion plan would look like. Truncation must come from interbank agree-
ments or from the Fed, which can deal with the changing needs of such a
program with administrative provisions flexible enough to keep up with
the changing technology. We had to content ourselves with authorizing
banks to enter into agreements providing for electronic presentment 2°
and drafting provisions that permit presentment to be made by electronic
means.
2 1
The UCC's limitations in dealing with technological change led to
the most divisive issue in the redraft of Article 4, the "safe harbor" provi-
sion in section 4-406(a). 22 The redraft of section 4-406 was designed to
accommodate three possible arrangements between customers and banks
with respect to canceled checks: (1) The payor bank returns the canceled
checks to its customer; (2) it retains the customer's checks and provides
the customer with a statement of account identifying the checks paid;
and (3) a collecting bank retains the checks, and the customer is provided
with a statement of account by the payor bank. The latter case is what
we have referred to as truncation. The divisive issue was how much in-
formation the statement of account was required to give the customer in
cases (2) and (3) above, in which the customer does not receive the can-
celed checks.
The safe harbor provision of section 4-406(a) states that the bank
need give its customer only the number, amount and date of payment of
the check.23 This information was chosen because it is cheaply available
to the payor bank through electronic data retrieval. Admittedly, it
would be easier for the customer to identify checks if the customer knew
the payee's name and the date of the check. However, in order for this
information to be provided with existing technology, banks would incur
substantial labor costs paying employees to decipher the names of the
payees on the customers' checks. In payor bank retention plans, such a
requirement would impose costs that banks would have to pass on to
20. Id.
21. Id. § 3-501(b)(1).
22. The safe harbor provision provides that "[t]he statement of account provides sufficient
information if the item is described by item number, amount, and date of payment." Id. § 4-
406; see also id. § 4-406 cmt. 1 ("[A] safe harbor rule is provided. If the item is described by
item number, amount, and date of payment, the bank does comply.").
23. Id § 4-406(a).
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customers. Additionally, this requirement would make collecting bank
retention plans of doubtful feasibility. Because the present trend is to-
ward payor-bank retention plans, and the future probably lies with a
nationwide collecting bank truncation regime, isn't the drafting commit-
tee's decision on this issue clearly in the best interests of bank customers?
Customers protest because technology already exists which would allow
banks to electronically send an image of checks. American Express,
which has high balance of account limits, has utilized imaging for years.
Nevertheless, image technology is not currently installed throughout the
banking system and may not be for several years. The best the drafting
committee could do in this matter was to promise that the Permanent
Editorial Board would review the safe harbor provision in the light of
future technological advances.2 4
IV. CONSUMER ISSUES
The UCC was drafted in the 1950s, before the consumer movement
had become a force to be reckoned with in state legislatures. By the time
revision of the UCC got underway in the 1980s, consumer interests were
well represented in the state legislatures by lawyers who were often as
well qualified and informed as those representing creditor groups. Con-
sumers, in the popular sense of the term, were not much concerned with
Article 4A, which expressly excluded consumer transactions, because
consumer transactions were already dealt with by the Electronic Fund
Transfer Act.25 Nor was there much consumer interest in Article 3. The
major issues concerning consumer paper had already been dealt with
either by state laws, like the UCCC, or by federal laws, such as the Truth
in Lending Act,26 the Fair Credit Billing Act27 or the FTC regulation
abolishing the holder-in-due-course doctrine.28
A few issues attracted consumer attention. The prairie populist
strain that runs through the NCCUSL overrode the drafting committee's
proposal to abolish the practice of allowing an accord and satisfaction to
be effectuated by a full satisfaction notation on a check. The consumer
view was that accord and satisfaction by notations on checks was the'
little person's means of dispute resolution. This may have been true, but
the practice was probably more commonly used by insurance companies
24. Id. § 4-406 emt. 1.
25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693-1693r (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
26. Id. §§ 1601-1665b (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
27. Id. §§ 1666-1666j (1988).
28. 16 C.F.R. §§ 433-433.3 (1992).
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on settlement checks.2 9 A solid consumer gain was achieved by revised
section 3-312, which offers a rather imaginative solution for the owner of
a cashier's check that has been lost or stolen.3 0 Now the owners of such
a check may obtain a refund or replacement check within a reasonable
period of time after the loss, without bearing the expense of posting a
bond. The bank obligated on the check also has full protection.
Throughout the project, most of the consumer attention was di-
rected at Article 4. Here, consumer representatives urged the drafting
committee to make a major change in the approach taken by old Article
4. The old Code set out some basic protection for customers-such as
the right to stop payment, the power to collect consequential damages for
wrongful dishonor, the liability of banks on unauthorized signatures,
etc.-and left the remaining aspects of the bank-customer relationship to
bank-customer deposit agreements, acts of Congress, regulations of the
Fed and other non-Code sources. 3' The consumer critique, which was
developed quite late in the drafting process and which did not flower
until after promulgation of Articles 3 and 4, called for Article 4 to regu-
late in greater detail the bank-customer relationship. 2 Under the con-
sumer perspective, the revision would have expressly subjected the bank-
customer agreement to unconscionability scrutiny; charges for bank serv-
ices would have been limited or (as in the case of stop order charges)
eliminated entirely; time limits would have been fixed for the perform-
ance by banks of certain duties, and penalties would be set for failure to
perform; and disclosure of deposit account costs would have been
mandated.
The drafting committee, undoubtedly influenced by previous failures
to gain consensus on consumer concerns in the UCC and related uniform
legislation, decided not to rework Article 4 from the consumer perspec-
tive.3" The drafting committee was reluctant to prescribe additional dis-
29. A workable compromise, reached after long deliberation, is found in U.C.C. § 3-311.
30. Id. § 3-312.
31. Id. § 4-103(1)-(2) (1987) (superseded by U.C.C. § 4-103(a)-(b) (1990)).
32. This critique is ably set forth in Gail K. Hillebrand, Revised Articles 3 and 4 of the
Uniform Commercial Code: A Consumer Perspective, 42 ALA. L. REv. 679, 719 (1991).
Although Ms. Hillebrand attended some sessions of the drafting committee and voiced con-
cerns then and in correspondence, my recollection is that she did not state her full case until
after Article 4 was promulgated. Her work was instrumental in making some important
changes in the official comments and in persuading the California Legislature to enact some
non-Code provisions to deal with issues raised by the enactment of revised Article 4.
33. See Miller, supra note 1, at 412-16 (detailing impact of NPC experience on drafting
committee's decision not to expand consumer protection aspects of Article 4). Professor




closure requirements, though a good case could be made that some were
needed, because, throughout the pendency of the Articles 3, 4 and 4A
project, Congress had been working on the Truth in Savings Act,34 which
finally appeared in late 1991. This law mandated that banks make copi-
ous disclosures to their depositors about fee schedules, charges, interest
rates and terms and conditions of deposit accounts.
Though the drafting committee had several influential members who
consistently saw issues from a consumer protection viewpoint, it de-
spaired of finding agreement on the bulk of the consumer agenda. The
membership of the NCCUSL and the ALI, both of which have strong
consumer voices, did not push the issue during their annual reviews of
the Article 4 drafts. Bank-customer agreements had been policed with
reasonable success by courts using the doctrines of unconscionability and
of good faith and fair dealing.35 Then, too, banks were exceedingly gun-
shy about provisions that would set them up for a wave of class-action
attacks, which they tended to view rather emotionally as legalized extor-
tion.36 Old Article 4 had worked reasonably well, and, without more
convincing evidence that customers were being harmed, the committee
decided to leave further customer protection to extra-Code law.
Without attempting to assess the merits of the consumer proposals,
it is my view that the NCCUSL-ALI consensual approach to uniform
state laws does not function well in dealing with controversial consumer
issues; consumers probably must look to Congress and non-Code state
laws for validation of their claims for greater protection in the payments
and credit areas. The failure of the drafters of original Article 9 in at-
tempting to successfully address consumer concerns was repeated in the
UCCC and the NPC. During the period when uniform state laws were
largely ineffective in producing consumer credit legislation, Congress en-
acted a series of landmark laws: the Truth in Lending Act," the Fair
34. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
242, 105 Stat. 2334 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4313 (Supp. III 1991)).
35. In Perdue v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 38 Cal. 3d 913, 702 P.2d 503, 216 Cal. Rptr. 345
(1985), appeal dismissed, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986), the California Supreme Court approved use of
the doctrine of unconscionability to allow a challenge of a $6 NSF charge. Id. at 928-29, 702
P.2d at 513-14, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 355-56. In Best v. United States Nat'l Bank, 739 P.2d 554
(Or. 1987), the court relied on the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing to sustain a class-
action suit challenging the validity of NSF service charges. Id. at 563.
36. While the project was proceeding, California banks were attempting to settle the nu-
merous class actions over the validity of their service charges spawned by the Perdue case. See
generally Attorney Warns Perdue Case only First of Upcoming Challenges to Bank Fees, 46
Wash. Fin. Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at 594 (Apr. 14, 1986) (describing expanding litigation against
banks and financial institutions following Perdue).
37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1677 (1988 & Supp. II 1990).
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Credit Reporting Act,3" the Electronic Fund Transfers Act39 and the
Truth in Savings Act." One can only conclude that the patient, concilia-
tory, consensus-building approach that has produced so much good com-
mercial law is not the approach to enhanced consumer protection.
Whether greater consumer protection-oriented regulation of the pay-
ments system is desirable is an issue that will be endlessly debated. The
fact that it is extremely difficult to reach consensus on consumer initia-
tives does not deter Congress; for Congress, after all, need not seek con-
sensus. With a few key subcommittee members, a dedicated staff and a
sympathetic leadership, Congress can act decisively in the face of consid-
erable opposition.
V. CONCLUSION
After some fifteen years of service as a reporter on NCCUSL
projects, I have gained great respect for both its drafting process and, for
the most part, its legislative product. In an era rife with allegations of
influence for sale in Congress and state legislative bodies, the NCCUSL
is incorruptible. It refuses to take contributions from groups affected by
its laws, and its members do not run for office. The Commissioners serve
without pay, and some of them make huge contributions of their time to
conference affairs. The ALI is an equally high-minded group. I think
the UCC is alive and well and will continue in that state into the next
century because the NCCUSL-ALI procedure for drafting commercial
laws with all its weaknesses and limitations is still the best that has been
conceived.41
38. Id. §§ 1681-1681t (1988 & Supp. 111990).
39. Id. §§ 1693-1693r (1988 & Supp. 11 1990).
40. 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4313 (Supp. III 1991).
41. All this having been said, I am compelled to add a frivolous footnote to point out that
the NCCUSL process is not particularly reporter-friendly. Although the reporter holds the
pen, his or her ideas must compete for support with those of the other participants to make the
final draft. This is as it should be. Moreover, a NCCUSL reporter must take the vow of deep
anonymity. After Llewellyn and Gilmore, how many UCC reporters can you name? One
usually must penetrate the central repository of uniform state laws, West's Uniform Laws An-
notated, before discovering the names of reporters. When, for promotion purposes, your
school asks what you have been publishing lately, it's a little disconcerting to show them the
product of five years' work that prints out in relatively few pages and, if it has any names on it
at all, bears the names of one hundred or so people. Scholarship by committee is not a concept
readily embraced by academic gate-keepers. But if the reporters are largely invisible, so are all
the other participants as well, particularly the members of the drafting committees who loyally
fly off to hotels that all look alike several times a year for numbing Friday-through-Sunday
meetings, poring over drafts. This is volunteerism at its best: a thousand points of law.
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